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Key points
1. The conservative ideology which has predominated in official 
discourse in Russia since 2011 has become the ideological founda-
tion of the Kremlin’s new political strategy that may be described 
as ‘the conservative project.’ Its main objective is to stabilise the 
regime, which felt challenged by the demands for liberalisation 
coming from the new middle class and part of the business and 
administrative elite. These demands, which are incompatible 
with Putin’s political regime, have been rejected by the Kremlin, 
and their supporters have been subjected to repression. The rul-
ing establishment has thus demonstrated that it expressly rules 
out any attempt to carry out a modernisation based on Western 
models. The Kremlin has indicated the existence of a funda-
mental discrepancy between Russia and contemporary Western 
civilisation, in order to create an ideological counterweight to 
liberalism and to rule out the transplantation of Western politi-
cal models into Russia. The Kremlin has also used this argument 
to justify Russian great power aspirations, implying the right to 
shape the world order, to legitimise its confrontation with the 
‘degenerate’ West, and to facilitate its search for allies.
2. Apart from the rhetoric, the Kremlin’s ‘conservative project’ in-
cludes a number of political and legislative measures aimed at 
strengthening the president’s position, subordinating business 
and administrative elites, and at mobilising public support. An 
important element of this ‘project’ is the so-called ‘nationalisa-
tion of the elite’, which entails disciplining members of the state 
administration and business and increasing their economic bur-
dens. In foreign policy, the project envisages the reintegration of 
the post-Soviet space under the aegis of Moscow, as evidenced 
by the annexation of Crimea and the attempt to establish a pro-
Russian quasi-state of ‘Novorossiya’ on the territory of Ukraine.
3. The Kremlin is approaching this conservative ideology purely 
instrumentally, using it to create an ideological counterweight 
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to its opponents who call for liberal reform of the current sys-
tem of government. Many of the laws enacted under the ban-
ner of ‘conservatism’ are not intended to create a social order 
consistent with conservative assumptions; in fact, the Krem-
lin has not formulated a positive vision for an ultimate social 
model based on these values. The purpose of these laws is to 
strike at the government’s opponents. Moreover, the actual 
conduct of the members of the ruling camp contradicts the 
values they profess, considering their extreme materialism 
and ostentatious consumerism and their symbiotic economic 
ties with the West.
4. For the time being, the implementation of the ‘conservative 
project’ has brought the authorities some ad hoc benefits, neu-
tralising the public’s discontent with the Kremlin’s policy and 
redirecting its frustration against the West. But in the longer 
term, the ‘project’s effectiveness as a tool for social mobilisa-
tion behind the government will be limited. The so-called ‘na-
tionalisation of the elite’ may prove especially counterproduc-
tive because it amplifies their discontent and anxiety, which 
over time will contribute to the destabilisation of the regime. 
On the international stage, the effectiveness of the ‘conserva-
tive project’ is limited in the short term, because it antagonises 
the Western political establishment and mobilises it to resist 
Russia’s aggressive policy. However it may prove more effec-
tive in the long run, if the European political scene is signifi-
cantly reshuffled; a harbinger of this is the ongoing rise in sup-
port for populist and Eurosceptic parties in national elections 
and the European Parliament.
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introduction
At the beginning of his third presidential terms, Vladimir Putin 
openly declared that he saw ‘conservative values’ as an ideological 
signpost for his policies. The Kremlin presented its own interpre-
tation of Russian political traditions and social model as repre-
senting ‘conservative values’. According to this line of reasoning, 
the Russian political tradition requires that the state authority be 
strong, centralised and hierarchic, and vested in a charismatic 
leader whose rule bears a special, quasi-sacred character, despite 
the formal maintenance of democratic (electoral) mechanisms 
of legitimacy. In the Kremlin’s interpretation, the Russian social 
model consists of the traditional family pattern (especially large 
families), a passive role for society in the political processes, and 
the presence of organised religion in the public life (with par-
ticular emphasis on the role of the Russian Orthodox Church) as 
a source of moral principles.
However, an analysis of the Kremlin’s policy leads to the conclu-
sion that it is treating this conservative ideology in a purely in-
strumental manner. The resort to conservatism is aimed solely at 
enhancing the legitimacy of the existing model of power by de-
fining it as being ‘traditional’ for Russia. While it is the Kremlin’s 
genuine intention to maintain a strong, centralised state power, 
the conservative social and moral rhetoric is in fact being used 
as just another ‘political technology’, i.e. a tool for manipulating 
public opinion, both domestically and abroad. Using this ideology 
does not mean that the current ruling camp really adheres to con-
servative values, or that it has a long-term programme to imple-
ment them. We are in fact dealing with another kind of ‘Potemkin 
village’, the aim of which is to divert public attention from Russia’s 
real socio-political and economic problems, and to provide the au-
thorities with arguments to implement repressive internal poli-
cies and an anti-Western foreign policy.
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i. the roots of the Kremlin’s 
‘conservatism’
Although conservative ideology has predominated in the Krem-
lin’s rhetoric for several years, it has not been yet presented as 
a formal and comprehensive concept. Its contents can be recon-
structed only on the basis of Vladimir Putin’s policy statements. 
References to conservative ideology appeared in Putin’s speech-
es and texts during his campaign before the 2012 presidential 
elections. Therein he emphasised the importance of ‘traditional 
values,’ which according to him include: a strong state power, 
political stability, a hierarchical social order, patriotism and 
a traditional family model. This has spurred Kremlin experts 
and officials to declare themselves supporters of the conserva-
tive line, and to develop conservative themes in their publica-
tions and speeches1. As a result, conservatism has come to domi-
nate the ruling camp’s ideological discourse, and begun to shape 
the official vision of Russia’s domestic governance and interna-
tional order.
The conservative threads emerged for the first time in January 
2012, in Putin’s pre-election article ‘Russia is concentrating2. In 
this article, Putin highlights the need to maintain political stabili-
ty, and argues that radical changes are detrimental to the success-
ful development of countries and societies. He also emphasises 
1 In May 2014 the ISEPI Foundation, headed by Dmitriy Badovskiy, a former 
employee of the Presidential Administration, organised the ‘Berdiayev 
Readings’, a conference on conservative ideas (to be held regularly); and in 
June 2014 the foundation started issuing a serial almanac called ‘Conserva-
tive Notebooks’ (http://www.isepr.ru/almanah), which includes articles by 
Natalia Narochnitskaya, Sergei Glazyev, Dmitriy Kisielov, Sergei Markov 
and others. In 2014 a training programme dedicated to the ‘conservative 
idea’ was organised for the staff of the Presidential Administration and the 
inner core of the All-Russian National Front; and Vyacheslav Nikonov, one 
of the Kremlin’s ideologues and the head of the Russkiy Mir foundation, led 
a seminar for the deputies of the State Duma on ‘Russian conservatism. The 
ideology of conservatism and conservative politics’.
2 http://putin2012.ru/#article-1
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that respect for a strong state is encoded in Russian culture, and 
that fidelity to traditional values and religions is a prerequisite for 
the consolidation of society.
Conservative themes appeared clearly and unambiguously in 
Putin’s addresses to parliament in 2012 and 2013, as well as in his 
speech at a meeting of the Valdai Club in 2013. The main theme of 
his December 2012 address was the need to return to ‘traditional 
values’ – the President declared that at the beginning of the twen-
ty-first century Russia had faced a “crisis of values”, and that Rus-
sian society lacked “spiritual ties” (духовные скрепы)3.
Putin presented himself explicitly as a conservative for the first 
time in his 2013 address to parliament. Citing the philosopher 
Nikolai Berdyaev, he stated that “the point of conservatism is not 
that it prevents movement forward and upward, but that it pre-
vents movement backward and downward, into chaotic darkness 
and a return to a primitive state”4. Putin stressed that Russia has 
assumed the position of a defender of traditional values which 
for thousands of years have formed the spiritual and moral un-
derpinnings of civilisations and nations: the traditional family, 
human life, religious and spiritual life, the values of humanism 
and global diversity. According to Putin, these values have been 
rejected by the West, which he accused of not just revising moral 
standards and blurring national and cultural identities, but even 
of an equating of good with evil. Such practices, Putin argued, un-
dermine the democratic nature of the Western countries because 
they are imposed against the will of the majority of their peoples. 
Moreover, in his opinion, the Western elites are trying to impose 
these liberal values on both Western and non-Western societies. 
In his opinion, such “attempts to impose a supposedly progressive 
3 Speech by the President to the Federal Assembly, 12 December 2012; http://
eng.kremlin.ru/news/4739
4 Speech by the President to the Federal Assembly, 12 December 2013; http://
eng.kremlin.ru/news/6402 
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model of development will lead to regression, barbarism and 
bloodshed.” Putin stressed that Russia is not alone in defending 
traditional values: “We know that the number of people who sup-
port us around the world is growing.”
Putin enlarged on themes of national identity and Christian 
values in a speech to the Valdai Club forum in 2013. He argued 
that in the modern world, success depends not only on military 
capabilities, but primarily on the intellectual, spiritual and 
moral accomplishments of the nation. Putin declared that Rus-
sia’s mission is to defend the values derived from Christianity 
and other world religions, and from the moral standards which 
have been developed over millennia, which are indispensable 
for the preservation of human dignity. He called for the mor-
al, intellectual and physical development of the human being 
to be recognised as the chief aim of the Russian government’s 
philosophy. Putin highlighted patriotism, civic responsibility, 
solidarity, and identification with Russian national interests 
as defined by the Kremlin as the foundations for the forma-
tion of civic identity among Russians. He described Russia as 
a state-civilisation, the core of which is the ethnic Russian na-
tion, and whose bonds are the Russian language and culture, 
the Orthodox religion and the other traditional religions of 
Russia (Islam, Judaism, Buddhism).
At the same time, Putin delivered a sharp criticism of Western 
civilisation, which is
“actually rejecting its roots. They are denying moral princi-
ples and all traditional identities: national, cultural, religious 
and even sexual. They are implementing policies that equate 
large families with same-sex partnerships, belief in God with 
the belief in Satan. And people are aggressively trying to ex-
port this model all over the world. Without the values embed-
ded in Christianity and other world religions, without the 
standards of morality that have taken shape over millennia, 
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people will inevitably lose their human dignity. We consider 
it natural and right to defend these values”5.
Putin also rejected what he described as ‘the so-called tolerance, 
neutered and barren’, being enforced by the West not only upon 
Russia but upon the whole world. In his opinion such actions, 
together with attempts to resuscitate the unipolar model of the 
world, will reduce sovereign states to the role of vassals.
5 Speech by President Putin at a meeting of the Valdai Club, 19 September 
2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6007
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ii. the genesis of the Kremlin’s 
‘conservative project’
Conservative themes are not entirely new in the Kremlin’s ide-
ological arsenal. They were first expressed when Putin came to 
power at the turn of 2000; and then after 2003, in response to the 
wave of ‘colour revolutions’ in the post-Soviet area. At that time, 
however, they did not dominate the Kremlin’s ideological mes-
sage, but rather coexisted alongside other ideological currents. 
It was only after Putin’s return to the presidency in May 2012 that 
the references to conservative, traditional values came to domi-
nate the Kremlin’s official narrative, and became the main ideo-
logical foundation of government policy.
When deciding on the use of conservatism for political purposes, 
Putin invoked a radical version of the concept which had previ-
ously existed on the margins of Russian political and intellectual 
life. This version was extremely anti-Western and anti-liberal, 
and called for the revival of the empire. These ideas have been 
developed and promoted since the early 1990s by writers and 
journalists like Aleksandr Dugin, Aleksandr Prokhanov, Mikhail 
Leontyev, Nikolai Starikov, Natalia Narochnitskaya, and also by 
the Russian Orthodox Archimandrite Tikhon (lay name Georgy 
Shevkunov), who is believed to be Putin’s personal confessor. 
The Kremlin began to attract and consolidate these hitherto dis-
persed and fragmented conservative circles, thus granting them 
greater political weight. As a result, the nationalist-conservative 
discourse – which until now had been peripheral in public debate 
in Russia – became dominant.
The Kremlin chose to use conservative ideology in reaction to the 
changing socio-political situation in Russia. In the last decade, as 
a result of economic growth and the spread of information tech-
nologies (especially the Internet), Russian society has developed 
an urban middle class, which is characterised not only by higher 
living standards, but also by a political culture different from that 
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of the post-Soviet period. In this group, demands have arisen for 
systemic reforms, including economic liberalisation and political 
pluralism, as well as the reduction of state interference in social 
life and space for grassroots civic initiatives. Putin’s return to the 
Kremlin shattered these groups’ hopes of fulfilling their aspira-
tions. This resulted in a build-up of discontent within this class, 
which took the form of street protests and a number of grassroots 
initiatives that represented mechanisms for holding the govern-
ment accountable to the public (including the independent ob-
servation of elections). In response, the ruling camp used force 
to suppress the protests, growing civic aspirations and activities. 
This meant that it has definitely abandoned any attempts to im-
plement modernisation based on the Western model.
Another reason why Putin raised the banner of conservatism was 
his belief that the susceptibility of part of the population to lib-
eral ideas stems from an ideological void which arose in the af-
termath of the discrediting and collapse of communism. There-
fore, the authorities believed it necessary to present society with 
an attractive ideological alternative that could fill this void, and 
thus prevent the spread of liberal attitudes and beliefs. This offer 
was aimed primarily at Putin’s traditional social base – the poor 
inhabitants of the provinces, employed in the public sector, indus-
try and agriculture.
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iii. the characteristics of the Kremlin’s 
‘conservatism’
A characteristic feature of the Kremlin’s ‘conservatism’ is the 
predominance of negative over positive assumptions. In this ide-
ology, the phenomena and values that Russia should be tackling 
are more distinctly and sharply defined, while its positive agenda 
remains vague and inchoate. This ideology is primarily opposed 
to the political, social and cultural models of the modern West. Its 
positive layer draws upon Russia’s traditional political and social 
model, which according to the authorities is not merely desirable, 
but simply immanent for Russia.
The Kremlin’s ideology preaches that Russia and the modern West 
represent fundamentally discrepant civilisations. These dis-
crepancies are a consequence of the West’s abandonment of the 
values of Christian civilisation and its rejection of traditionally 
understood identities – of nation, culture, religion, gender, and 
even of the distinction between good and evil. The Kremlin posi-
tions Russia as a defender and mainstay of European civilisation. 
At the same time, by highlighting the divergence between Russia 
and contemporary Western civilisation, the Kremlin intends to 
rule out any chance of Western political models being adopted in 
Russia. Moreover, this ideology assumes that the way to solve the 
problems plaguing Russia lies not in systemic reforms, but in the 
moral and spiritual healing of society.
On the positive side, the Kremlin’s ideology advocates main-
taining political and social stability, the revival of national 
identity and the cultivation of patriotism, a return to the tra-
ditional model of the family, state paternalism and social cor-
poratism. In particular this ideology, drawing on its own inter-
pretation of the Russian political tradition, proclaims the need 
to maintain a strong, hierarchical and centralised state power 
in Russia. The epitome of this should be a charismatic leader, 
whose authority has a special, quasi-sacred character, despite 
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the formal maintenance of democratic (electoral) mechanisms 
of its legitimacy.
This ideology presents society (the people) as being rooted in 
Russian tradition and naturally wedded to conservative values. 
It calls for the cultivation of the traditional model of a large family 
with many children, as well as the reinstatement of the Ortho-
dox Church (and other traditional religions) as a source of moral 
principles in social and public life. The Kremlin’s ‘conservatism’ 
contrasts the Russian people with the elites; the latter – due to 
their involvement in international economic relations in a glo-
balised world, and their interests related to this – are presented 
as vulnerable to external geopolitical pressures and to Western 
ideological influence. The government thus appeals to genuine 
social sentiments which combine anti-elitism, anti-Americanism 
and xenophobia. At the same time, in the Kremlin’s vision of the 
model of the state, the role of society (the people) is that of a sub-
ject, limited to passive participation in the processes initiated by 
the authorities.
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iv. the ‘conservative project’ in domestic 
politics
The Kremlin’s reaction to the political and social challenges fac-
ing it has not been limited to the ideological sphere. Invoking con-
servative values, the Kremlin has taken a number of steps aimed 
at consolidating the regime. These steps have followed a consist-
ent pattern suggesting that the Kremlin has devised and is imple-
menting an overarching political strategy that can be described 
as ‘the conservative project’. It should be noted, however, that the 
authorities have never presented a comprehensive concept of this 
‘project’, for example in the form of a formal programme or a pub-
licly announced strategy.
As part of this project, the Kremlin has taken comprehensive 
counter-reforming measures, leading to the further centrali-
sation of power; restricting political activity and curbing civil 
rights; it intensified harassment of the opposition; taken steps to 
discipline the administrative and business elites; reinforced the 
repressive apparatus and expanded its prerogatives6. Although 
the Kremlin had resorted to repression against the opposition 
before, under the banner of the ‘conservative project’ it has ex-
tended them beyond the political sphere, and applied to people 
who are not direct political opponents of the regime. The regime 
has now penalised any behaviours and attitudes that go beyond 
the traditional (as the Kremlin defines it) canon of lifestyle and 
worldview (as exemplified, among others, by the prison sentences 
handed down to the members of Pussy Riot). The broadly defined 
opposition has also been subjected to a propaganda campaign 
invoking conservative values; this has equated any criticism of 
the authoritarian system of government with opposition to Rus-
sia as such, or even with treason. It has also strove to discredit 
6 For more information, see Jadwiga Rogoża, ‘Putin’s correction of the state: 
under the banner of conservatism’, OSW Analyses, 18 December 2013, http://
www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analisy/2013-12-18/korekta-panstwa-puti-
na-pod-szyldem-konserwatyzmu
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the opposition by arguing that liberal democratic ideology that 
it proclaims will lead naturally and inevitably to the spread of 
non-traditional lifestyles in society, as allegedly evidenced by the 
transformation of everyday customs in the West. As part of the 
‘conservative project’, the Kremlin has also used institutions of 
the Russian Orthodox Church to wage its propaganda against the 
liberal opposition. Finally, one of the government’s most effective 
tactics has been to brand the opposition of a large part of liberal 
circles to the annexation of Crimea as being anti-Russian and 
unpatriotic (Putin has described opponents of the annexation as 
“national traitors”) – which puts liberals beyond the pale of of-
ficial political competition.
An important element of the ‘conservative project’ is the disci-
plining measures taken by the authorities against the Russian 
elite, a process which has become known as ‘nationalisation of 
the elites’. These measures were a reaction to the scepticism Putin 
had faced from part of the elite upon his return to the Kremlin 
in 2012. In response, the presidential administration has moved 
to strengthen the mechanisms which render the elite dependent 
on the Kremlin and enforce obedience to the president. Kremlin 
propaganda pictured the elites’ contacts and business ties with 
the West as an instrument of their subordination to foreign po-
litical centres, which undermined their loyalty to Moscow. At 
the Kremlin’s initiative, parliament has adopted a series of laws 
which have tightened the presidential administration’s supervi-
sion of the foreign assets and business activities of Russian offi-
cials and employees of state corporations. They have been banned 
from owning foreign bank accounts and obligated to disclose the 
sources of funds for purchase of properties abroad. They were 
also obliged to declare any second (and subsequent) citizenships. 
The Kremlin has created a special register of these two groups’ 
assets, including data on financial transactions.
One of the ‘project’s goals is to demonstrate that Putin’s policies en-
joy the support of the majority of the general public, and that the 
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people are opposed to the idea of liberal reforms. Drawing on the 
conservative ideology, the project contrasts the ‘corrupt’ elites and 
‘demoralised’ middle class with the ‘ordinary people’, who alleg-
edly remain faithful to traditional values, and are therefore not 
susceptible to anti-Putin slogans. According to the Kremlin, the 
group of the ‘ordinary people’ includes the inhabitants of provin-
cial towns and rural areas, with lower standards of living, as well 
as employees of the public sector and industrial plants. On the ba-
sis of this group, in 2011 the Kremlin created the All-Russia Popu-
lar Front, which simulates a genuine social movement, although 
in reality it is a centrally-controlled structure managed by Krem-
lin officials. This Front, professing a conservative ideology, was 
intended to serve as a counterweight to both the liberal protest 
movement and to Putin’s own political base, the United Russia 
party, which was losing public support and undergoing internal 
erosion at the time.
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v. ‘conservatism’ as an instrument  
of foreign policy
Putin’s ‘conservatism’ was devised not only with a Russian au-
dience in mind, but also with the intention of using it as a tool 
of foreign policy. Both Putin and the Russian ruling elite believe 
that the current international situation is characterised by grow-
ing competition between the great powers. In their view, this 
is increasingly acquiring a civilisational dimension, involving 
a choice between alternative paths of development and different 
socio-political models. The regime’s leading representatives have 
openly declared that the West, particularly the United States, is 
seeking to impose Western values on Russia in order to create fa-
vourable conditions for the anti-system opposition, which they 
will subsequently use to overthrow the current government in 
Russia (as part of a policy of ‘colour revolutions’). So in the eyes 
of the Kremlin, the ideological sphere has become an important 
part of international competition. The Kremlin considers it es-
sential to formulate an attractive ideological message in order to 
legitimise Russia’s aspirations to the role of a great power which 
influences the shape of the global international order. This mes-
sage is also meant to increase Russia’s attractiveness as the patron 
of those political forces that are opposed to Western liberalism 
(especially in its post-modern form) as well as to the hegemony of 
the US and the EU.
This offer is a conservative ideology which proclaims the need to 
observe traditional values, based on the teachings of the world’s 
great religions, and to preserve national identities, as well as po-
litical and social stability. At the same time, Russian diplomacy 
and propaganda has been systematically building and promoting 
a narrative in which the world is threatened on one hand by re-
ligious and political radicalism (Islamists, fascists, nationalists), 
and on the other by the postmodern liberalism of the West, be-
hind which lies the American pursuit of world hegemony. In this 
narrative, Russia is presented as the main defender of a stable 
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international order, traditional state sovereignty, and civilisa-
tional and political pluralism throughout the world.
This conservative ideological (and political) offer is aimed at those 
sections of the European elite which are Eurosceptic, anti-Amer-
ican and hostile to globalisation, and which defend traditional 
conservative Christian values. Such tendencies can be found 
both on the right (the French National Front and the conservative 
Gaullists, Hungarian Jobbik, the German AfD) as well as on the 
left (post-communist and communist parties in Europe, including 
the German Die Linke and the Greek Syriza). The Kremlin’s ‘con-
servative’ ideology is also intended to appeal to the so-called ‘si-
lent majority’, that is, ‘average’ EU citizens, who (in the opinion of 
the Kremlin’s experts) are disillusioned with the European pro-
ject, and are becoming increasingly critical of their own elites and 
the postmodern values and patterns of behaviour which these 
elites propagate. In the United States, meanwhile, the Kremlin is 
trying to reach conservative Christian circles with its ideological 
message, especially those that defend the traditional family mod-
el and oppose abortion. In the United States the Kremlin is also 
addressing supporters of isolationism, and those who urge Wash-
ington to respect the interests of other great powers and to seek 
agreement with Russia in the face of the rising power of China. 
Russian propaganda also draws on the economic crisis in Europe, 
and the growing disillusionment with both the European Union 
and the political forces that have so far dominated the political 
scene in Europe. The Kremlin’s conservative ideology draws in-
directly on Putin’s idea of a ‘Great Europe’ which is to be based 
on a double pillar of the European Union and the Eurasian Union, 
which together should form a ‘common economic and cultural 
space’ extending “from Lisbon to Vladivostok”7.
7 For more information, see Marek Menkiszak, ‘United Europe. Putin’s vision 
of European (dis)integration’, OSW Studies, October 2013, http://www.osw.
waw.pl/node/21241
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Another part of the Kremlin’s ‘conservative project’ is the concept 
of the so-called Russian World (Русский Мир),8 which has been 
promoted by the Russian state since 2006. The ‘Russian World’ 
is defined as a community of people who identify themselves not 
merely with Russian language and culture, but also with the tra-
ditions and achievements of the Russian Empire and the Soviet 
Union. This concept postulates the existence of a separate, mul-
tiethnic and multireligious Russian civilisation, which has the 
status of one of the world’s great civilisations. The primary aim 
of cultivating a sense of community thus defined is to weaken 
national identities of the citizens of post-Soviet states; to build 
up their ties with, and loyalty to, the Russian state; and to pro-
mote the idea that Russia alone can be their natural civilisational 
and political centre. Thus, the concept of the Russian World is an 
important tool in the Kremlin’s policy for reintegrating the post-
Soviet space under the leadership and the domination of Russia. 
The Kremlin has also invoked this idea in its propaganda to le-
gitimise the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the ‘hybrid 
war’ against Ukraine, pointing to the religious, historical and 
ethnic ties which these territories have with Russia. Crimea was 
portrayed as ‘the Temple Mount in Jerusalem,’ and eastern and 
southern Ukraine as ‘Novorossiya’9.
8 Marek Menkiszak, ‘The Putin Doctrine: Creating the conceptual foundations 
for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area’, OSW Commentary, 27 March 
2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2014-03-27/
doktryna-putina-tworzenie-koncepcyjnych-podstaw-rosyjskiej
9 Speech by Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly, 4 December 2014, http://
news.kremlin.ru/news/47173; Putin’s speech at a meeting of the Valdai Club 
participants, 24 October 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru/news/46860, and in 
an interview on 17 April 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru/news/20796
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vi. the ‘conservative project’: an effective 
tool or a self-delusional mirage?
The Kremlin’s adoption of the new ‘conservative’ ideology, and 
the implementation of the political project based on it, seems in 
the short term to have brought the Kremlin the desired results. 
In contrast, however, the long-term consequences may be unfa-
vourable for the authorities.
For the time being the implementation of the ‘conservative project’ 
has inhibited the erosion of legitimacy of the regime. It has consoli-
dated most of the elite around President Putin, suppressing the bur-
geoning symptoms of dissatisfaction with the direction in which 
the regime has been developing. The project has also expanded the 
Kremlin’s mechanisms for monitoring the elites, whose fear of re-
prisals means that they only occasionally dare to take the risk of 
publicly protesting against the policy line currently pursued by the 
authorities. Moreover, Putin’s policies delegitimise and hinder any 
action which the opposition takes against him.
By appealing to conservative ideology, the authorities have man-
aged to increase public support for Putin and justify the repressive 
measures taken against members of the elite and the middle class. 
The Kremlin’s actions, aimed both at the oligarchs and at various 
minorities (sexual, religious, ethnic), together with slogans against 
‘American imperialism’ and Western interference in the post-Soviet 
states, have met with an enthusiastic reception among broad sec-
tions of society. Equally effective means of mobilising public support 
for the Kremlin has been the aggressive, anti-Western foreign policy. 
The annexation of Crimea proved particularly efficacious, raising 
President Putin’s approval ratings from 60% to over 80%10 and con-
solidating both the Russian public and the elites around the Kremlin.
10 According to a survey by WCIOM of 15 May 2014, support for Putin rose from 
60.9% in January 2014 to a record 85.9%. The Levada Centre poll of 30 April 
2014 recorded an increase from 65% in January to 82% in April 2014.
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Making a foreign policy tool out of the conservative ideology has 
also allowed Russia to expand the camp of its supporters in Eu-
rope by attracting the radical, populist and Eurosceptic right, 
which over the past few years, thanks to its electoral success, 
has moved from the fringes into the centre of European politics. 
The invocation of conservative ideology has also reinforced the 
Kremlin’s attempts to establish a tactical alliance with conserva-
tive Christian circles (also within the Roman Catholic Church), 
both in Europe and the United States. The ‘conservatism’ pro-
claimed by the Kremlin also seems to have been quite an effective 
tool against the ‘soft power’ of the European Union in the morally 
conservative post-Soviet societies, as is particularly evident in 
Georgia and Moldova, and was also observed in Ukraine before 
the Russian aggression.
On the other hand, among the mainstream of Western public opin-
ion and in the Western political establishment, the donning of the 
conservative mask by the Kremlin has contributed significantly to 
a loss of sympathy, or even to an increase in hostility towards Rus-
sia, and in particular to its current authorities. Meanwhile within 
Russia, this conservative ideology will not solve the fundamental 
problem of the fragile legitimacy of the Kremlin’s authority in the 
eyes of that part of the Russian elite which had been expecting 
a gradual liberalisation of the system – primarily of private busi-
ness, of a large part of the state administration (including the so-
called ‘establishment liberals’), and also of the more affluent so-
cial groups (i.e. the middle class). So far, these groups have been 
the main beneficiaries of Russia’s economic and technological co-
operation with the West, the modalities of which allowed them to 
have a share in revenues from Russian raw material exports and 
to deposit, invest and spend their funds in the West. The Kremlin’s 
sharp anti-Western policy shift and the annexation of Crimea are 
definitely not in their interest. The sanctions imposed by the West 
have already caused significant financial losses, and they fear that 
there will be yet more such. The concerns of these groups have 
been further heightened by the Kremlin’s efforts to redistribute 
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the largest assets (the Bashneft case), triggered by the worsening 
economic situation11. Therefore in the long run, forcing through 
the ‘conservative project’ carries the risk of destabilising the re-
gime, because it is antagonising many groups within the elite and 
the affluent social strata, worsening their economic condition, 
and undermining their sense of security.
In addition, the Kremlin can hardly count on active public support 
for its ideological project. The deeply rooted passivity of Russian 
society means that even those initiatives it supports rarely mobi-
lise them to undertake grassroots activity in accordance with the 
instructions of the Kremlin ideologues. One such example was the 
anti-Kremlin street protests in 2011-2012, when the authorities were 
forced to put a great deal of effort into organising rallies supporting 
Putin and to bring entire factory crews to those rallies. Many of the 
conservative demands put forward by the Kremlin diverge from 
the real needs and aspirations of broader social groups. The pro-
posed ‘traditional family values’ are in conflict with contemporary 
Russian mores, and the Orthodox values being propagated contrast 
with the Russian people’s minimal level of real involvement in reli-
gious practice and the life of the Church12.
The impact of the Kremlin’s conservative ideology may also be 
weakened by the fact that the ruling clan itself sees this ideology 
11 The nationalisation of the Bashneft oil company, which belonged to Vladimir 
Yevtushenkov, one of Russia’s richest men, was a negative sign for business. 
Russian companies now fear that this may be just the beginning of another 
wave of redistribution of assets, caused by the deterioration of the economic 
situation and the contraction of the resources available to the state and the 
oligarchs closest to the Kremlin.
12 Although around 73% of the Russian population declare themselves to be Or-
thodox, only around 3% regularly attend church and receive the sacraments 
(Levada Centre study, 2009). According to data from the Russian Ministry 
of Internal Affairs from 2013, the Easter celebrations (the highest holiday of 
the Orthodox year) were attended by less than 4% of the population. In ad-
dition, Russia has the world’s highest divorce rate (UN demographic data for 
2012). Russia is also a world leader in terms of abortions (which are legally 
permitted and subsidised by the state); it ranks first in the world in propor-
tion to the population, and second place in absolute terms (after China).
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in purely instrumental terms. Many of the ‘conservative’ declara-
tions are in fact feigned and used for propaganda purposes; the 
Kremlin’s actions do not affect the oligarchic nature of Putin’s sys-
tem, nor do they translate into an increase in the influence of ‘the 
people’ on the mechanisms governing the state. The extreme ma-
terialism and ostentatious consumerism of the ruling elite stand 
in stark contrast to the values proclaimed, something which has 
not escaped public attention. There is a glaring discrepancy be-
tween the government’s patriotic and anti-Western phraseology 
and the spectacular consumption of Western goods by its repre-
sentatives. Due to its instrumental nature, the Kremlin’s ideology 
cannot build a lasting and genuine relationship between the gov-
ernment and society which would protect the government against 
a loss of support caused by the deterioration of economic condi-
tions in Russia.
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